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INTRODUCTION
Frank Robbins owned a ranch and guest lodge in beautiful
northwest Wyoming.1 Robbins did not have a typical American
neighbor, as his ranch neighbored land owned by the State of
Wyoming, the federal Bureau of Land Management (BLM), and
private ranchers.2 When the BLM discovered that Robbins's ranch
was unencumbered,3 it demanded an easement from him. Robbins
tried to negotiate payment for the easement, but the BLM flatly
refused, declaring that "the Federal Government does not negoti-
ate."4 And negotiate it did not.
The BLM instead warned Robbins that "there would be war, a
long war and [the BLM] would outlast him and outspend him."'
BLM bureaucrats promised to "bury Frank Robbins."' And they
were right-for over the next seven years, the BLM engaged in a
systematic campaign of harassment and intimidation against
Robbins.7 BLM agents trespassed on Robbins's land8 and broke into
his lodge.9 They tried to provoke violence between Robbins and
another neighbor.1" In addition to denying Robbins's access rights
to federal land, the BLM revoked his special use permits, which
1. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2589 (2007).
2. Id. The Federal Government is a common landowner in the area-it owns almost all
of the land in Wyoming, and most of the land in the Mountain West. See United States
Department of Agriculture: Natural Resources Conservation Service, Percent of Land in
Federal Ownership, 1997, http://www.nrcs.usda.gov/technicaINRI/maps/meta/m5554.html
(last visited Mar. 3, 2009).
3. Before Robbins bought his ranch, George Nelson, the previous owner, granted the
BLM an easement over his road in exchange for the right to maintain a road across BLM
property. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. at 2593. But the BLM made a "careless error" when it forgot to
record the easement onto the deed. Id. at 2608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). When Robbins
bought the ranch, therefore, the deed was unencumbered by the BLM easement. His right to
exclude, the quintessential stick in the bundle of property rights, remained legally intact. Id.
at 2593 (majority opinion).
4. Id.
5. Id. at 2610 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
6. Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755, 760 (10th Cir. 2006), rev'd, 127 S. Ct. 2588 (2007).
7. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. at 2608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
8. Id. at 2611.
9. Id. at 2596 (majority opinion).
10. Id. at 2594.
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were the primary source of his ranch's revenue.11 Agents conducted
surveillance on Robbins's guests, at times videotaping women using
the restroom. 12 As time progressed, so too did the BLM's tactics,
morphing beyond small-scale torts and economic intimidation. BLM
bureaucrats tried to persuade other federal agencies to harass
Robbins." When that avenue failed, the BLM bureaucrats filed false
criminal charges against Robbins. 4 A jury, disgusted by the way the
BLM "railroaded" Robbins, acquitted him in less than thirty
minutes. 5 The pattern of harassment went on and on, but Robbins
never gave away his easement.
Robbins sued BLM supervisor Charles Wilkie, seeking money
damages. 6 Conceding that no actual taking of property occurred,
Robbins argued that the federal officials should pay damages for
trying to extract, through a pattern of retaliatory intimidation, his
property without just compensation. 7 According to the Supreme
Court, however, the central issue did not concern property rights,
remedies, or improper retaliation for the assertion of constitutional
rights. It was a matter of jurisdiction-namely, whether Robbins
could seek money damages against federal agents under the Fifth
Amendment in the absence of congressional authorization.18 In
Wilkie v. Robbins, the Court refused to find a damages remedy
under the doctrine of Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics
Agents. 9 Bivens allows, under certain circumstances, the victim of
11. Id.
12. Id. at 2615 n.7 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 2596 (majority opinion).
14. Id. at 2595.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 2596.
17. Id. at 2608 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18. Id. at 2597 (majority opinion).
19. Id. at 2604-05 (noting that a remedy for "when Government employees are unduly
zealous in pressing a governmental interest affecting property would invite an onslaught of
Bivens actions"). In Bivens, the Supreme Court held that Bivens-a victim of an erroneous
and humiliating search by federal narcotics agents-could seek damages under the Fourth
Amendment even if Congress provided no damages remedy for the unconstitutional federal
action. Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). In this Note, Bivens actions refer to judicially crafted
damages suits against federal agents for putative constitutional violations. "Constitutional
torts" refer to damages suits against state and federal employees for constitutional violations.
Examples are Bivens actions and liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for unconstitutional conduct
by a state official.
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unconstitutional harm to pursue money damages against a federal
official, even when Congress has not authorized a damages rem-
edy.2
0
Robbins illustrates the range of economic incentives in play
when federal officials bargain land-use provisions with private
landowners. This Note is not a doctrinal criticism of Robbins.21
Robbins, instead, is used as a timely example of how federal agents
can make an end-run around the Takings Clause and extract
property rights through nuisance-like behavior. This Note explores
whether an economic analysis justifies a Bivens action in these
cases. Although it concludes that a Bivens remedy increases opti-
mal deterrence of unconstitutional federal land-use policies, this
Note finds that a Bivens action, on its own, cannot achieve optimal
deterrence.
Part I discusses the standard for measuring economic efficiency.
Constitutional torts and takings doctrine both search for the
efficient result. Despite this superficial similarity, the two have
completely different efficiency paradigms. Constitutional torts are
geared toward the optimal deterrence of unconstitutional conduct.
Judicial interpretation of the Takings Clause, on the other hand,
focuses on the optimal allocation of social resources. What is eco-
nomically "efficient" in a Takings Clause case is quite different from
the "efficient" outcome in a constitutional torts case. In a case like
Robbins, in which the two underlying policies may coincide, an
explicit decision must be made between optimal deterrence and
wealth-maximization. Part I concludes that optimal deterrence
should be the measure of efficiency.
Part II catalogues the costs and benefits of Bivens. Parts II.A
and II.B conclude that a Bivens action is likely more efficient if a
landowner cannot pursue other monetary remedies. In fact, Bivens
authorizes money damages based in part on whether the victim has
access to adequate alternative relief.22 This makes economic sense.
If a victim cannot access alternative remedies, federal agents would
20. See generally infra Part I.A.
21. For doctrinal criticisms of the Court's holding, see Robbins, 127 S. Ct. at 2608-18
(Ginsburg, J., dissenting in part); Laurence H. Tribe, Death by a Thousand Cuts:
Constitutional Wrongs Without Remedies After Wilkie v. Robbins, 2006-2007 CATO SUP. CT.
REv. 23, 23-77.
22. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
2009] 1743
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
have little incentive to curb their unconstitutional behavior.
Underdeterrence would occur. If adequate alternative remedies
already exist, then a Bivens action would be redundant, perhaps
subjecting federal agents to more liability than necessary.
Overdeterrence would occur. Part II.C considers the related doctrine
of qualified immunity. Because qualified immunity already combats
the costs related to overdeterrence, an economic analysis of Bivens
need not dwell on the costs associated with swamping federal
officials with constitutional tort liability. At the same time, qualified
immunity imposes significant costs. These costs should lead courts
to find more Bivens actions valid.
As Part III explains, a Bivens action has an increased deterrent
effect if the landowner and federal agents are playing an "iterated"
game. When a federal official violates a particular victim's constitu-
tional rights in a discrete, one-shot deal, a constitutional tort
action may not deter the official from harming the victim again,
even if it deters the official from harming everybody else. In cases
like Robbins, however, the same federal agents repeatedly interact
with the same landowner. Because the parties are the same, the
game is said to be "iterated." The deterrence effect of a Bivens action
may be stronger in preventing the same federal agents from
harming the same landowner in an iterated game.
Part IV situates Bivens claims for federal violations of property
rights against nuisance common law. Takings literature does not
successfully address the harassment in Robbins. As Part IV shows,
such harassment is more doctrinally and economically akin to
common law nuisance, which focuses on optimizing deterrence and
maximizing societal value.
Combining the insights of game theory, nuisance, constitutional
torts, and takings, Part V demonstrates that a Bivens action for
intentional federal nuisance-like behavior would have a salutary
deterrent effect. Bivens is the appropriate mechanism to deter end-
runs around the Takings Clause. Part V concludes by proposing a
Bivens action that would protect landowners from federal harass-
ment while preventing an explosion of litigation against the federal
government. The proposed cause of action is sensitive to the absence
of remedial alternatives under tort and takings law. It also accounts
1744 [Vol. 50:1739
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for the fact that such harassment, like nuisance, is an iterated
game.
I. WHAT IS THE "EFFICIENT" RESULT?
Before undertaking an economic analysis, it is important to
specify the normative standard of comparison. According to the
classic law and economics model set forth by Judge Richard Posner,
efficiency "denote[s] that allocation of resources in which value is
maximized."23 The value of a good or service is subjective-it is
whatever a person is willing to pay,24 and economists make no
judgment whether the preference is good or bad. When most
economists proclaim a transaction "efficient," they usually refer to
Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, under which the winners could hypotheti-
cally compensate the losers such that the result would be Pareto
superior, and thus, nobody is worse off.2" However much other
policies-like corrective justice-matter above and beyond economic
efficiency,26 they are not the focus of this Note. The economic
analysis here, rather, is positive instead of normative. As a positive
inquiry, this Note "accepts the given goal, makes certain assump-
tions, and then identifies which legal rule would be most efficient
within this framework."27
Before concluding that a Bivens remedy maximizes the relevant
values, one must ask what the relevant values are. The relevant
values depend on the legal doctrines in play, the personal prefer-
ences and incentives that drive the relevant actors, and the effects
of the actors' behavior. In evaluating the efficiency of money dam-
23. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW II (6th ed. 2003).
24. Id. at 10.
25. Id. at 12. There is another standard for efficiency called "Pareto superiority." A
transaction is "Pareto superior" if and only if it makes at least one person better off and
nobody worse off. Id. But this standard is less useful because Pareto superiority assumes that
there are no externalities--that is, it does not consider that people who are not parties to the
transaction could become losers. Id.
26. See, e.g., Jules L. Coleman, The Practice of Corrective Justice, in PHILOSOPHICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF TORT LAW 53 (David G. Owen ed., 1995); see also Alexander B. Mass, Tort
Experiments in the Laboratories of Democracy, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1501 (2009) (discussing
the ways in which torts serve both private and public law goals).
27. Charles F. Campbell, Jr., An Economic View of Developments in the Harmless Error
and Exclusionary Rules, 42 BAYLOR L. REV. 499, 501 (1990).
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ages, this Note tackles the intersection of takings doctrine and
constitutional torts. The first issue, then, is whether the efficient
outcome should be dictated by (1) the constitutional torts approach
or (2) the takings approach. To simplify, in the constitutional torts
approach, courts and scholars try to prevent governmental miscon-
duct just enough to promote legitimate governmental policies.28
Takings doctrine and scholarship, by contrast, focus on spreading
loss, maximizing social wealth, and preserving the physical and
economic value of the property.29 Although not mutually exclusive,
these normative goals can conflict. An economic analysis, thus, must
make an explicit choice between the two. ° The remainder of this
Section does just that.
A. Approach One: The Constitutional Torts Approach
When a government official unconstitutionally harms a citizen,
a court may order the government to compensate the victim. But
not always. This result is surprising because remedies matter.
Remedies determine the scope, power, and, arguably, the existence
of rights.3" Remedies for constitutional wrongs arise in three ways.
The first arises from the Constitution itself. The Fifth Amendment,
for instance, explicitly provides its own remedy-just compensation
-when the government "takes" a property right.3 The second is
28. See infra Part I.A.
29. See infra Part I.B.
30. See, e.g., A. Mitchell Polinksy & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An
Economic Analysis, 82 GEO. L.J. 397, 413 (1993) (favoring deterrence as the standard to
analyze fee allocation schemes as remedies for frivolous suits).
31. See James J. Park, The Constitutional Tort Action as Individual Remedy, 38 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 393, 414-22 (2003) (discussing how constitutional tort remedies shape
constitutional rights).
32. U.S. CONST. amend. V. The Takings Clause is "self-executing" in the sense that a
plaintiff may bring an actionable suit even if the state has not statutorily waived its sovereign
immunity. See First English Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v. County of Los
Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 316 n.9 (1987) ('The Solicitor General urges that the prohibitory
nature of the Fifth Amendment, combined with principles of sovereign immunity, establishes
that the Amendment itself is only a limitation on the power of the Government to act, not a
remedial provision. The cases cited in the text, we think, refute the argument of the United
States that the Constitution does not, of its own force, furnish a basis for a court to award
money damages against the government. Though arising in various factual and jurisdictional
settings, these cases make clear that it is the Constitution that dictates the remedy for
interference with property rights amounting to a taking." (internal citations and quotation
[Vol. 50:17391746
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statutory. Recognizing that state officials may abuse the federal
constitutional rights of their citizens, Congress authorized money
damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Congress never did offer the same
blanket protection against federal officials, however.33 In light of
congressional inaction, the Supreme Court recognized that it could
create constitutional remedies. The doctrine of Bivens allows a
victim to pursue money damages when federal officials violate
some, 34 but not all,3 5 constitutional rights. The classical Bivens rule
states that a court will allow the plaintiff to seek damages against
a federal official for unconstitutional behavior unless there are
"special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative
action by Congress."36
One might reformulate Bivens, then, to authorize compensation
when (1) administrative or statutorily prescribed compensation is
unavailable37 and (2) there are no unique policies militating against
money damages. After Bivens, the Supreme Court capaciously
defined the "special factors counseling hesitation," thereby narrow-
ing the opportunity for monetary compensation, and often causing
marks omitted)).
33. Congress has, however, waived its sovereign immunity in limited situations by
opening the federal government to damages suits. See, e.g., Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1346(b) (2006); Tucker Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2006). See generally Gregory Sisk, The
Continuing Drift of Sovereign Immunity Jurisprudence, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 517, 535
(2008) (discussing the FTCA); id. at 565 (discussing the Tucker Act).
34. See Carlson v. Green, 446 U.S. 14 (1980) (allowing Bivens compensation for cruel and
unusual treatment in a federal prison); Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228 (1979) (allowing
Bivens when a federal agent fires his subordinate in violation of Due Process).
35. See FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471 (1994) (foreclosing Bivens actions against federal
agencies); Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412 (1988) (denying Bivens relief for improper
denial of Social Security benefits, in violation of Due Process); United States v. Stanley, 483
U.S. 669, 681 (1987) (disallowing Bivens actions by military personnel for injury "incident to
service"); Chappell v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296 (1983) (denying enlisted military employees a
Bivens action for the unconstitutional behavior of their underlings); Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S.
367 (1983) (denying a First Amendment Bivens claim when a federal agent demotes his
employee for making statements critical of the federal agency).
36. Bivens, 403 U.S. at 396. As Professor Tribe contends, however, the Supreme Court
may have reversed the Bivens rule-exception structure such that a damages remedy is now
the exception. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 63-72. Whatever the validity of that interpretation,
this Note refers to money damages as the rule because the Bivens Court expressed damages
as the rule.
37. See, e.g., Schweiker, 487 U.S. 412; Lucas, 462 U.S. 367.
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the Court to arrive at results inconsistent with the original Bivens
rule.38
The response to Bivens centers on familiar issues.39 The most
robust debate surrounding constitutional torts concerns their
deterrent effect. 40 One must differentiate specific deterrence from
38. See, e.g., Stanley, 483 U.S. at 669. Civilian Army officials experimented on James B.
Stanley by secretly dosing him with LSD, thereby destroying his cognition, physical and
psychological health, and even his marriage. The FTCA barred Stanley from monetary relief.
Nonetheless, the Court denied Stanley Bivens relief because the FTCA's denial of damages
evidenced a "special factor counselling hesitation." Id. at 683-84. ("[I]t is irrelevant to a
'special factors' analysis whether the laws currently on the books afford Stanley, or any
particular serviceman, an 'adequate' federal remedy for his injuries. The special factor that
counsels hesitation is not the fact that Congress has chosen to afford some manner of relief
in the particular case, but the fact that congressionally uninvited intrusion into military
affairs by the judiciary is inappropriate."). In other words, because Congress chose not to
afford a damages remedy, the Court concluded that a Bivens remedy was inappropriate,
despite the fact that Bivens exists precisely to combat congressional inaction. See also Arar
v. Ashcroft, 532 F.3d 157 (2d Cir. 2008) (denying a Bivens cause of action to a Canadian
citizen that the United States government detained and transported to Syria, where he was
tortured, on the grounds that matters of national security and international comity constitute
special factors).
39. For instance, appealing to the oft-quoted dictum from Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
163 (1803) ("The very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual
to claim the protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury."), proponents of Bivens
argue that courts should find damages remedies for all constitutional violations, regardless
of congressional authorization. See, e.g., Susan Bandes, Reinventing Bivens: The Self-
Executing Constitution, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 289 (1995). Opponents respond that courts engage
in illegitimate policymaking when they find implied damages remedies. See, e.g., Davis v.
Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 250 (1979) (Burger, J., dissenting). Because Congress has the power
to enact causes of action and remedies, the argument goes, courts violate the separation of
powers when they allow plaintiffs to seek damages. Id. at 250-51.
40. Daryl Levinson has challenged the orthodox view that Bivens and § 1983 actions deter.
Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REv. 345 (2000). Unlike private firms, he argues, the
federal government responds to political-not monetary-costs. Id. at 346. The government
is not as sensitive to monetary costs because its institutional goal is not to maximize wealth.
Id. at 350. Thus, Levinson argues, because Bivens actions do not give the federal government
the proper incentives to behave, their deterrent effects are overrated. Id. at 420. But see
Lawrence Rosenthal, A Theory of Governmental Damages Liability: Torts, Constitutional
Torts, and Takings, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 797, 842 (2007) ("Thus, Professor Levinson is wrong
to believe that governmental liability has only indeterminate effects. Whatever its defects
from the standpoint of corrective justice, governmental tort liability has an instrumental
justification; it creates an incentive on the part of officeholders to allocate resources to loss
prevention. There should be a clear political incentive to invest in loss prevention at least
when the cost of avoiding an injury is small, the likelihood of injury is great, and the impact
on the government's budget is likely to be large."). Interestingly, however, monetary
incentives may have motivated the BLM agents in Robbins. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 60
n.147 ("In the Robbins case, the BLM employees obviously had an incentive to avoid looking
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general deterrence.4' Specific deterrence occurs when the same
parties are deterred from repeating their behavior.4 ' This is in
contradistinction to general deterrence, which measures whether
anybody has fewer incentives to act.43 The traditional consensus is
that, in the very least, Bivens has a general deterrent effect. In
other words, Bivens remedies constrain federal agents from vio-
lating constitutional rights.44 Even the opponents of Bivens seem to
agree. The longstanding debate, then, was not about the existence of
a deterrent effect, but rather the desirability of it. 45
Social scientists express deterrence in terms of "expected
utility. '46 Given the probability that certain events will occur, ex-
pected utility determines whether it is rational for certain actors to
behave a certain way. For instance, when a federal official violates
a constitutional right, the issue is whether the costs internalized by
the official outweighs the likely benefits he will receive. The costs
could include, but are not limited to, the political fallout within a
governmental agency, the time and effort to act, or judicial sanc-
sloppy and wasteful due to their own negligence in losing the original easement, and may also
have harbored an inchoate hope that they would be rewarded financially, through monetary
bonuses or raises, for their efforts against Robbins, especially if those efforts proved
successful.").
41. See generally Isaac Ehrlich, Participation in fllegitimate Activities: An Economic
Analysis, in ESSAYS IN THE ECONOMICS OF CRIME AND PUNISHMENT 68-134 (Gary S. Becker &
William M. Landes eds., 1974); Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169, 180 (1968).
42. WAYNE R. LAFAVE, MODERN CRIMINAL LAw 2 (1978).
43. Id.
44. See, e.g., FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471,485 ("It must be remembered that the purpose
of Bivens is to deter the officer."). See generally Myriam E. Gilles, In Defense of Making
Government Pay: The Deterrent Effect of Constitutional Tort Remedies, 35 GA. L. REV. 845
(2001).
45. See Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 824 ("Initially, the assumption that governmental tort
liability works in the same manner as the common-law liability of private tortfeasors went
unquestioned."). But see Levinson, supra note 40, at 355; Cornelia T.L. Pillard, Taking Fiction
Seriously: The Strange Results of Public Officials'Individual Liability Under Bivens, 88 GEO.
L.J. 65 (1999) (arguing that Bivens has had little deterrent effect because courts act as if the
plaintiff were suing the federal government instead of a federal officer in his individual
capacity). Pillard's data may underestimate Bivens' deterrent effect, however. See Marc L.
Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Secret Police and the Mysterious Case of the Missing Tort Claims,
52 BUFF. L. REV. 757, 766-80 (2004) (concluding that scholars underestimate the deterrent
effect of constitutional tort suits by studying court opinions at the expense of news reports and
secret settlements).
46. See, e.g., Ronald L. Akers, Rational Choice, Deterrence, and Social Learning Theory
in Criminology: The Path Not Taken, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 653, 655 (1990).
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tions, such as money damages. Assuming that the federal official is
rational, he will violate constitutional rights when and only when
the marginal value of deterrence is less than the marginal cost of
deterrence-that is, when his expected benefits exceed his expected
costs.47
Optimal deterrence occurs when the benefits to the official equal
the costs.48 Differently put, "[t]he expression 'optimal deterrence'
then interjects the problem of deterring all and only that conduct
which is deemed undesirable. 'Under-deterrence' and 'over-deter-
rence,' of course, signify failures at both ends of that endeavor."49
Underdeterrence would occur if the unconstitutional harm went
undetected, or if its benefits to the federal agent were greater if he
committed unconstitutional harms than if he did not.50
Optimal deterrence occurs when the penalty is the cost borne
by victim multiplied by the probability of apprehension and
conviction.5 Mathematically, optimal deterrence occurs when f =
C/p; f denotes the fine needed to achieve optimal deterrence, C
refers to the cost borne by the victim, and p is the probability of
sanction."
47. See Hamish Stewart, Economic Analysis of Law: Which Way Ahead?, 53 U. TORONTO
L.J. 425, 428 (2003).
48. Id.
49. Alexandra White Dunahoe, Revisiting the Cost-Benefit Calculus of the Misbehaving
Prosecutor: Deterrence Economics and Transitory Prosecutors, 61 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L.
45, 55 (2005).
50. Jeffrey Standen, The Exclusionary Rule and Damages: An Economic Comparison of
Private Remedies for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 2000 BYU L. REv. 1443, 1448.
51. Richard A. Posner, Rethinking the Fourth Amendment, 1982SuP. CT.REV. 49,54 n.17.
This mathematical formulation is well known in the common law of torts. In United States
v. Carroll Towing Co., Judge Learned Hand captured expected utility in his classic BPL
formula. 159 F.2d 169 (2d Cir. 1947). The formula for optimal deterrence balanced three
variables: the expected burden of non-negligence (B), the likelihood of liability (P), and the
amount of liability (L). See Stewart, supra note 47, at 428. Suboptimal deterrence would occur
if the probability or amount of liability was sufficiently small such that B > PL. Id.
Overdeterrence would occur when the expected costs to the federal official exceed the expected
benefits-that is, when B < PL. Id. Optimal deterrence occurs when B = PL. Id.
52. Posner, supra note 51, at 54 n.17.
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B. Approach Two: The Takings Clause Approach
Courts and scholars take a very different tack in analyzing the
Takings Clause.53 Land-use regulations and constitutional torts
share a superficial similarity: the government acts in a way that
tangibly "harms" an individual-say, through the denial or destruc-
tion of property rights. Certainly there is a Takings Clause issue
implicated by the harassment discussed by this Note. In Robbins,
for instance, the Tenth Circuit reasoned that the Fifth Amendment
preserves a "right to exclude," which, "[if it] means anything, ...
must include the right to prevent the government from gaining an
ownership interest in one's property outside the procedures of the
Takings Clause."54 That being the case, however, an economic
analysis of takings is very different from an economic analysis of
constitutional torts.
Land-use policy is efficient under one of two circumstances.55 The
first solution is to allow unfettered private bargaining, consistent
with the Coase Theorem.56 The second solution is to eliminate
private bargaining altogether, making the government the unilat-
eral decision maker.57
Scholars have tried to blend the public and private models into a
practical solution. These solutions consider multiple factors, such
as: moral hazard, adverse selection, the risk of excessive regulation,
bilateral monopoly, the social utility of government involvement, the
lost value of the private property, government deterrence, and the
53. U.S. CONST. amend. V ("... [N]or shall private property be taken for public use, without
just compensation.").
54. Robbins v. Wilkie, 433 F.3d 755, 766 (10th Cir. 2006), rev'd on other grounds, 127 S.
Ct. 2588 (2007).
55. See William A. Fischel, Introduction: Utilitarian Balancing and Formalism in
Takings, 88 COLUM. L. REv. 1581, 1583-84 (1988).
56. Id. at 1583; see Ronald H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960)
(arguing that in the absence of transaction costs, so long as there is a bright-line legal rule,
private bargaining will always yield the efficient outcome).
57. See Fischel, supra note 55, at 1583-84. See Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed,
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARv. L.
REv. 1089 (1972).
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transaction costs of administering remedies.58 Law and economics
scholars debate on how to balance these factors. 9
Economic analyses of takings purport to reach the optimal
balance of these variables. One theory considers full compensation
to be inefficient because it gives landowners the incentive to
overinvest in their property.' This theory gives primacy to the so-
called moral hazard problem, under which a potential victim is
encouraged to be more reckless than she would have otherwise
been.61 Conversely, if a landowner receives no compensation, the
government has greater incentives to make inefficient decisions.62
Another theory suggests that the government pay compensation
when it provides public goods, but not when it shifts entitlements
from one private party to another.63 A third theory suggests
balancing the "demoralization costs" of not paying compensation
against the transaction costs of paying.64 A fourth theory argues
that efficient compensation occurs when the government compen-
sates private land use that conforms to social norms, but not those
that are "subnormal"; the idea here is that most citizens will by
definition conform to normal land use, and so the transaction costs
would be smaller.65 Professors Blume and Rubinfeld propose that
just compensation is akin to government-supplied insurance against
regulatory risk; the private market cannot supply this insurance,
they contend, because of adverse selection and moral hazard.66
Under another theory, compensation is justified if and only if (1)
the private land use was efficient when the government decided to
58. See, e.g., Ian Ayres & Eric Talley, Solomonic Bargaining: Dividing a Legal Entitlement
to Facilitate Coasean Trade, 104 YALE L.J. 1027 (1995).
59. See id. (addressing other positions argued by academics attempting to fashion a
framework for dividing entitlements).
60. Lawrence Blume et al., The Taking of Land: When Should Compensation Be Paid?,
99 Q.J. ECON. 71, 71 (1984).
61. Id. at 84.
62. William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation
for Takings, 9 INT'L REV. L. & ECON. 115 (1989).
63. Joseph L. Sax, Takings, Private Property, and Public Rights, 81 YALE L.J. 149 (1971);
Joseph L. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
64. Frank I. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical
Foundations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
65. Fischel, supra note 55, at 1584-85.
66. Lawrence Blume & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Compensation for Takings: An Economic
Analysis, 72 CAL. L. REV. 569 (1984).
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regulate it, or (2) the government regulation was inefficiently
imposed.67 According to Professor Richard Epstein, torts against
property are takings under the Fifth Amendment.6"
Many other law and economics theories of takings undoubtedly
exist. The point, however, is that prominent theories focus on the
best way to maximize social value. Deterring bad faith governmen-
tal conduct is one of many factors to examine, but it is surely not the
sole focus.
Case-in-point: in defining per se takings, the Court treats optimal
deterrence as an irrelevant factor. In most cases, land-use-related
harassment is not a per se taking. A per se taking occurs under one
of two circumstances. The first is when the government physically
occupies land for a permanent period of time, regardless of the
social or governmental benefits.69 Such occupations, by denying
the landowner the use of a part of his property, must also trample
on the right to exclude, thereby effecting a Fifth Amendment vio-
lation.7" This did not occur in Robbins, as BLM agents did not
permanently trespass or erect physical structures on the land.71 The
second type of per se taking happens when the government deprives
the property of "all economically beneficial or productive use."72
Here, because BLM bureaucrats deprived Robbins of some-but not
all--of his land's value, no per se taking occurred.7" Deterrence
plays little part in determining a per se taking. Instead the Court
seems more concerned with demarcating the metaphysical bound-
aries of physical property, and protecting those boundaries with a
bright-line rule.
67. Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson, Regulatory Takings: When Should
Compensation Be Paid?, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 749, 750 (1994).
68. See RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 35-38 (1985). Epstein's view is particularly relevant because the difference between
takings and government-imposed torts shares important qualities, while fracturing along
other relevant dimensions. See infra discussion Part IV.B.
69. Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
70. Id. at 435-36.
71. See Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2602 (2007).
72. Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992).
73. Compare Robbins, 127 S. Ct. at 2588, with Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe
Reg'l Planning Agency, 535 U.S. 302 (2002) (finding that a regulation barring the landowner
from constructing on his property for thirty-two months is not a permanent deprivation of all
economic value).
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The Court's regulatory takings jurisprudence also discounts the
importance of deterring wrongful governmental conduct. In Penn
Central Transportation Co. v. City of New York,74 the Court applied
an "ad hoc" analysis to determine if land-use regulations violated
the Takings Clause.75 The Court balanced (1) the economic impact
on the owner, (2) the value of the property taken, and (3) the
character of the governmental action. 76 The three factors ostensibly
focused on the social benefits of regulation weighed against the
individualized harm the owner suffered. Notably absent from the
Court's analysis, however, was any mention of deterrence. The
Court, in fact, gave deterrence short shrift, as, over the years, it was
understood Penn Central gave rational basis review of regulations.77
The Court also failed to distinguish between "social benefit" and
"private governmental benefit." The Court's failure to distinguish
makes little sense: society may not benefit from regulations, but the
relevant governmental officials certainly may. At any rate, it is now
clear that regulations can survive a regulatory takings challenge
even when they do not "substantially advance legitimate state
interests.7 8
Although the Court demanded that trial courts balance various
factors to determine when the government regulation becomes a
taking, trial courts treat the Penn Central factors as an "empty
ritual,"7 9 in fact applying deferential rational basis review in its
stead. Given the limited scope and practical impotence of a regula-
tory takings remedy, it offers no relief when federal officials harass
a landowner in trying to extract a property right. Because regula-
tory takings law does not focus on deterrence, it is not a useful
conceptual mechanism to apply here. In other words, regulatory
74. 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
75. Id. at 124.
76. Id.
77. See, e.g., Eric R. Claeys, Takings, Regulations, and Natural Property Rights, 88
CORNELL L. REv. 1549, 1557 (2003).
78. Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., 544 U.S. 528, 540-41 (2005).
79. See Basil H. Mattingly, Forum over Substance: The Empty Ritual of Balancing in
Regulatory Takings Jurisprudence, 36 WILLAME'IrE L. REV. 695, 699 (2000) (statistically
demonstrating that "the property owner is unlikely to prevail under [Penn Central]").
Mattingly's empirical analysis revealed that "the 'balancing' test appears to be nothing more
than a strong presumption in favor of no compensation, regardless of the impact of the
regulation." Id.
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takings law has no answer when government agents extract private
property through harassment.
8 0
C. The Superiority of the Constitutional Torts Approach
Optimal deterrence is a superior metric in federal land-use
situations. Doctrinally, the type of harm more resembles a tort
than a taking. Remedies under the Takings Clause aim to redress
a specific harm, and takings jurisprudence does not regulate the
harm of harassment inflicted by federal employees. Substantive
takings law-regulatory takings, public use, and just compensation
doctrines-is currently so weak that it fails to protect the property
rights in question. Constitutional torts, by contrast, are harm-
neutral, as they can apply to any range of conduct, from police
brutality to sexual harassment. The takings approach is inadequate
80. The preceding discussion assumes that a federal court has jurisdiction to hear the case
when a state or municipality takes the property. That assumption, however, is weakening
thanks to the Supreme Court's recent decision in San Remo Hotel, L.P. v. City & County of
San Francisco, 545 U.S. 323 (2005).
For a federal takings suit to be ripe, the plaintiff must go through state administrative
proceedings. Williamson County Reg7 Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City,
473 U.S. 172, 194-95 (1985); see also DAVID A. DANA & THOMAS W. MERRILL, PROPERTY:
TAKINGS 264 (2002). But once the plaintiff goes through the administrative proceedings, state
preclusion laws, which the federal court must follow under the full faith and credit statute,
bar the federal court from hearing the takings claim. See 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2000) (requiring
federal courts to give "full faith and credit" to acts or judicial proceedings of any state). Thus,
the Court's decisions in Williamson County and San Remo Hotel suggest that the
Section 1983 action is no longer the exclusive province of federal law and
jurisdiction. While federal law is still operative in takings cases, it is applied in
state, rather than federal, courts. Despite this shift from past practices, the
Court has not yet signaled a willingness to shift the doctrine further-such as it
has in Bivens, where state tort law has begun to supplant federal constitutional
law. Nonetheless, this further shift is quite plausible, especially considering the
new composition of the Court and existing precedent requiring the adjudication
of federal rights occur in state courts. If state courts are considered competent
to adjudicate these claims, it may not be long before state law-already
considered adequate in Bivens suits-is considered adequate for Section 1983
claims as well.
John F. Preis, Alternative State Remedies in Constitutional Torts, 40 CONN. L. REV. 723, 733
(2008); see also Stewart E. Sterk, The Demise of Federal Takings Litigation, 48 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 251, 254 (2006). As this Note does not deal with takings by states or municipalities,
the "Williamson trap" is not explored in further detail. It is mentioned, however, to underscore
the disrespect takings suits receive in federal court, which is relevant to the larger theme of
this Note.
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for several other reasons. First, takings do not properly emphasize
the role of deterrence. Second, wealth maximization and loss-
spreading is more apposite for state and local-not federal-takings,
where local officials have better incentives and knowledge to reach
the socially beneficial outcome. When discussing the "efficient"
result, then, the Note refers to the outcome that optimally deters.
II. THE COSTS AND BENEFITS OF BIVENS
The literature on Bivens largely ignores an important distinction.
The literature does not take into account the economic effect of the
Bivens rule and its exceptions. Under its traditional formulation, a
court will allow the plaintiff to seek damages against a federal
official for unconstitutional behavior unless there are "special
factors counselling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by
Congress."'" All things being equal, a damages remedy is more
efficient when the case falls within the Bivens rule-that is, in the
absence of an alternative congressional or administrative remedy.
A. Why Not Injunctive Relief?
Cataloging the costs and benefits of Bivens presupposes that a
damages remedy has a superior deterrent effect over injunctive or
declaratory relief. But that assumption is not immediately obvious.
Its validity depends on the specific factual setting. 2 Phrased dif-
ferently, relative to money damages, the issue is whether an
injunction creates better incentives for federal agents. This Section
offers several general observations on why a damages remedy is a
better tool to optimize deterrence. 3
81. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 396
(1971).
82. See generally Calabresi & Melamed, supra note 57 (famously discussing the inevitable
and important economic choice between "liability rules," which require damage remedies, and
"property rules," which require injunctive remedies); see also Park, supra note 31, at 450-51
(arguing that the effectiveness of structural injunctions at regulating government officials'
discretion to indirect unconstitutional harm depends on the factual and legal setting).
83. The debate between monetary and injunctive relief recurs in the context of nuisance
common law. See infra Part III.B.
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In constitutional torts, damages typically compensate victims for
the value they have lost.' Injunctions instead deny defendants the
value they have gained.85 For an injunctive remedy to deter more
than damages, one of three conditions must occur.8" First, injunc-
tions would be superior deterrents if the value of the federal agent's
benefits exceed the value lost by the victim.87 Second, injunctions
would serve a better deterrent effect if they created better detection
rates than damages.88 Injunctive remedies would create better
detection rates if they incentivized plaintiffs to file additional suits
and led courts to enjoin unconstitutional behavior more often. Third,
injunctions would prove a better deterrent than damages if the
potential gain to the government was very large, even if the
probability of its occurrence was very small.89 In this situation, the
aggregate gains would exceed the aggregate losses, even if it were
unlikely to occur in any individual instance.
All three scenarios are unlikely.9 ° Just like police officers, federal
agents create more loss than gain. That is, when federal agents
violate property rights, the harm they inflict on the victim likely
exceeds the benefits they receive. Take Robbins as an example.
True, federal agents were trying to exact an easement from the
citizen, l which was presumably worth less than the value of the
property. There was no evidence, however, that the government
would have put the easement to socially valuable use. So, the loss
to Robbins made the government's benefits of the easement pale by
comparison. Moreover, the personal utility of the easement to the
BLM agents probably did not match the Robbins's subjective
valuation of the property. Landowners tend to value their property
at rates higher than market value. 2
84. See Standen, supra note 50, at 1450.






91. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2593 (2007).
92. In takings cases, market value usually refers to the value imputed during a forced
exchange. See, e.g., Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States, 338 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1949). But, of
course, as Posner notes, market value is in fact the price at which two or more parties
voluntarily transact. POSNER, supra note 23, at 55. Therefore, when the government forces
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B. The Economics of the Exceptions to Bivens
Bivens and its lineage distinguish between scenarios in which (1)
the plaintiff has access to an alternative and adequate remedial
scheme, and (2) the plaintiff will leave empty handed in the
absence of a Bivens remedy.9" For instance, in Bush v. Lucas,94
NASA demoted one of its employees for criticizing the agency.95 The
employee filed a Bivens suit under the First Amendment, but
ultimately lost because he had access to an alternative administra-
tive remedy.96 This doctrinal distinction has critical implications for
optimal deterrence. All else being equal,97 the Court's reasoning
makes economic sense in theory. When there is an alternative
remedial scheme, the Court is economically justified in denying a
Bivens action, because (1) the relative transaction costs of imple-
menting a new remedy would be high, and (2) the relative benefits
to the plaintiff would be low.98
The most common cost associated with Bivens is its chilling effect
on legitimate governmental activity. Analogizing to the purpose of
the Eleventh Amendment, some complain that constitutional torts
would paralyze the government's ability to perform its routine
duties.99 But that is not the only potential cost. If a state law remedy
already existed, some argue, a Bivens remedy might crowd out state
protection of individual rights,"' which would impose its own set of
a transfer of property after the preliminary opportunity to bargain, the landowner must have
valued the property more than what the government offered. Id.
93. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388,396-
97 (1971).
94. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
95. Id. at 369-70.
96. Id. at 374-90.
97. As it turns out, all things were not equal in Bush, because that case represents an
iterated game, which would be a factor suggesting enforcement of a Bivens action. See infra
Part III.
98. See PETER H. SCHUCK, SUING GOVERNMENT: CITIZEN REMEDIES FOR OFFICAL WRONGS
79-80 (1983).
99. See, e.g., id. at 59-81. But cf. Kurt T. Lash, Leaving the Chisholm Trail: The Eleventh
Amendment and the Background Principle of Strict Construction, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1577 (2009) (arguing that the original drafters of the Eleventh Amendment were more
concerned with preserving state sovereignty than the effective provision of services or
protection of their treasury).
100. See Christina Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REV. 5,8 (1980) ("One of the
explanations used to support the Supreme Court's retrenchment on section 1983 claims has
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costs. According to John Jefferies, Bivens actions could impose a
different nontrivial cost.'' A Bivens action increases the costs of
enforcing a constitutional right; thus, courts are more likely to limit
the scope of the right in order to limit its costs.1"2 In other words, a
Bivens action could potentially jeopardize the positive expansion of
a constitutional right. °3 Jefferies qualifies that this effect is merely
a negative on the cost-benefit ledger, not a dispositive argument
against Bivens as a whole.'0 4
Another negative on the Bivens ledger is transaction costs. The
transaction costs of a new Bivens action would be high for several
reasons. Most obviously, the amount of litigation would increase,
although it is prospectively difficult to estimate how much. 05 This
is because a judge would have to draw lines between compensable
and noncompensable constitutional rights. °6 Taking Robbins as an
example, if the Supreme Court found a Bivens action, the limiting
principle is not immediately obvious.0 7 It could limit the action to
even been the redundancy of section 1983 actions and state tort law.").
101. John C. Jefferies, The Right-Remedy Gap in Constitutional Law, 109 YALE L.J. 87,90-
91 (1999).
102. Id.
103. Id. at 91.
104. Id. at 113-14. Jefferies's argument does not have much force against this Note's thesis,
however, because the property right in question is already very limited, and the Court has not
indicated a willingness to expand it. See infra notes 134-41 and accompanying text.
105. The Court articulated this fear in Robbins. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2604
(2007) ("Exercising any governmental authority affecting the value or enjoyment of property
interests would fall within the Bivens regime, and across this enormous swath of potential
litigation would hover the difficulty of devising a 'too much' standard that could guide an
employee's conduct and a judicial factfinder's conclusion."). But see Theodore Eisenberg,
Section 1983: Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CORNELL L. REV. 482, 524
(1982) ("[T]he sheer volume of section 1983 cases poses no serious threat to the federal court
system. Section 1983 cases neither place unbearable burdens on the courts nor direct massive
resources to relatively minor claims.").
106. Cf. Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104 (1978) (a regulatory
Taking in which the Court worried about the costs associated with line-drawing). But in that
case, as with other regulatory takings cases, the regulator was the state or municipality,
which has police power. The municipality's police power may have cautioned the Court away
from finding a compensable property right. The federal government, on the other hand, does
not have a plenary police power. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 566 (1995) ("The
Constitution ... withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would authorize
enactment of every type of legislation.").
107. This is because, as James Park notes, the nature of the remedy depends on, and
sometimes defines, the scope of the constitutional right. See Park, supra note 31, at 419-22.
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the intentional destruction of property rights.' Or it could limit the
action to government retaliation for asserting any property right,
like the right to alienate. 9 It could also strictly limit the action only
to government retaliation for asserting the right to exclude." 0 In the
latter case, it is not clear why the right to exclude should enjoy any
more protection than other quintessential "sticks in the bundle,"
such as the right to alienate."1 Similarly, it is uncertain why the
Court should narrowly define a Bivens action to a very specific
factual situation." 2 A court could avoid the harshness of bright
lines by using a balancing test, but that would add even more uncer-
tainty, raising the likelihood of potentially frivolous litigation."' In
any case, whatever line the court draws, aggrieved plaintiffs will
sue, asking to clarify and expand the new damages doctrine." 4 This
is a burden on judicial economy.
Although the transaction costs of a new Bivens action could be
great, the social benefits might be meager in comparison. Assume,
for instance, the plaintiff has access to compensation through
another federally provided substitute-say, the FTCA or Tucker
Act. In this event, the plaintiffs expected utility would be non-
negative if the expected remediation from the compensatory sub-
stitute equaled or exceeded the expected compensation from a
Bivens action. Or, if the compensatory substitute would not yield as
much compensation as a Bivens action, the difference may not be
great enough to matter, considering the administrative costs of a
new Bivens action."' Bivens-type damages would be efficient only




112. See Bandes, supra note 39, at 328-32.
113. See Pillard, supra note 45, at 66 (arguing that the Court's current framework prevents
clarity and coherence when deciding constitutional tort litigation); cf. Keith N. Hylton, A
Missing Markets Theory of Tort Law, 90 Nw. U. L. REv. 977, 989-93 (1996) (noting that strict
liability tends to be more efficient than negligence when the transaction costs of negligence
trials are higher).
114. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics Agents,
403 U.S. 388, 411 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring).
115. See, e.g., Pillard, supra note 45, at 66 (describing how almost all of the Bivens actions
between 1971 and 1985 have not yielded relief for the plaintiff ("When analyzed by traditional
measures of a claim's 'success'-whether damages were obtained through settlement or court
order-Bivens litigation is fruitless and wasteful, because it does not provide the remedies
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when the plaintiffs expected verdict would outweigh litigation costs
and the alternative remedy.
On the other hand, if a court denies Bivens relief when the victim
has no other avenue for money damages, the reasoning above is
more suspect. To be sure, the public does not have to shoulder the
administrative costs of increased litigation. But the costs are high
for the victim. Stripped of any meaningful check on its power, the
federal government and its officials have no incentive to lower
either its activity level or care level of constitutional violations." 6
The absence of a Bivens action could lead to (1) a greater number
of constitutional violations, or (2) more severe constitutional
violations. Without Bivens, federal employees might not have an
incentive to refrain from committing unconstitutional harms.
However plausible this theory, it assumes that a court can accu-
rately determine the adequacy of another compensation scheme.
This assumption might undercut the inherent limits in the Bivens
doctrine, for courts arguably lack the expertise and legitimacy to
determine if a congressional remedy is "good enough.""' 7 Assume, for
instance, that Congress or an administrative agency created a re-
medial program that severely undercompensated victims injured
by a federal actor. Under Bivens and its progeny, a court will likely
not entertain a Bivens action because the victim was afforded an
alternative remedial scheme. In such a case, federal officials
might have more incentives to cost-effectively violate constitutional
rights because their expected liability would be lower."' Moreover,
public choice theory suggests that congressional or administrative
remediation could be inadequate, because Congress has little self-
contemplated by the decision, and it burdens litigants and the judicial system.")).
116. Activity level refers to the amount of action a person takes. STEVEN SHAVELL,
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 41 (2004). If Joe shoots skeet twice a week, whereas Frank
shoots three times a week, Frank's activity level is higher than Joe's. Care level refers to the
amount of prudence taken when engaging in an activity. Id. If Frank shoots in a secluded
area, whereas Joe shoots in a highly populated area, Frank's care level is higher than Joe's.
117. See, e.g., Schweiker v. Chilicky, 487 U.S. 412, 429 (1988). But see Bandes, supra note
39, at 320-22 (arguing that the relative competencies of the judiciary and legislature are
"beside the point").
118. This borrows from the notion of efficient breach in contracts, under which a rational
actor would (and should) breach a contract when the cost of liability would be less than the
expected damages. See generally, Richard Craswell, Efficiency, Renegotiation, and the Theory
of Efficient Breach, 61 S. CAL. L. REV. 629 (1988).
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interest to open its constituency-federal employees-to liability
while limiting their discretion." 9 And even if Congress did open the
federal employees to liability, it would likely not protect those with
little political influence, because the political benefits of doing so
would be relatively small. 2 0 Rather, rent seeking and interest group
pressure might sway the federal government towards inefficient
land-use regulation. 2' In short, a court operates with a margin of
error when it decides whether Bivens or its exceptions control.
Thus, when Congress does not specify a remedial scheme to
address a constitutional violation, and when courts give plaintiffs a
clear, sweeping Bivens action to a constitutional right, (1) the trans-
action costs of uncertainty may be reduced, and (2) the government
may reduce its activity level of unconstitutional behavior.
C. The Effect of Qualified Immunity
One cannot analyze the costs and benefits of Bivens in a vacuum.
As it turns out, the supposed costs of Bivens litigation are overrated
because qualified immunity already minimizes them. The benefits
of Bivens litigation, on the other hand, may be underrated because
qualified immunity inflicts pernicious costs that Bivens litigation
may correct.'22
119. See Donald A. Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRiM.
L. REV. 1, 20 n. 105 (2001) (characterizing Congress's inaction as a "sign" of its disinterest in
pursuing an administrative remedy). But see Federal Torts Claim Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346(b),
2671-2680 (2000) (waiving the sovereign immunity of the federal government under certain
conditions).
120. Cf. Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of Public
Choice; Or, Why Don't Legislatures Give a Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44
SYRACUSE L. REV. 1079, 1089-90 (1993) (arguing that public choice explains why legislatures
fail to protect the rights of the accused).
121. See Daniel A. Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT'L REV. L. &
ECON. 125, 137 (1992).
122. See, e.g., Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 456
F.2d 1339, 1341 (2d Cir. 1972) (holding, on remand, from Bivens, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), "[t]hat
it is a valid defense to such charges to allege and prove that the federal agent or other federal
police officer acted in the matter complained of in good faith and with a reasonable belief in
the validity of the arrest and search and in the necessity for carrying out the arrest and
search in the way the arrest was made and the search was conducted"). See generally Gary
S. Gildin, The Standard of Culpability in Section 1983 and Bivens Actions: The Prima Facie
Case, Qualified Immunity and the Constitution, 11 HOFSTRA L. REV. 557 (1983).
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In determining whether qualified immunity shields a federal
agent's conduct from Bivens liability, a court conducts a two-step
inquiry. First, it determines whether a Bivens action exists. 2 3 Next,
if a Bivens action exists, the court asks whether qualified immunity
nonetheless bars the plaintiffs suit.124 A state actor is not entitled
to qualified immunity if(1) the plaintiff's allegations, assuming they
are true, establish a constitutional violation, (2) the constitutional
right at issue was clearly established at the time of the putative
violation,125 and (3) a reasonable officer, situated similarly to
defendant, would have understood the challenged act or omission to
contravene the discerned constitutional right."'2 This burden is very
difficult to overcome. 127
Qualified immunity, as one commentator suggests, is a heuristic
that siphons out unconstitutional behavior with some redeeming
social utility. 2 ' Qualified immunity makes no attempt to eliminate
all unconstitutional behavior that is, on the net, socially detri-
mental. Rather, by presuming that the governmental employee is
immune from liability, qualified immunity only penalizes behavior
that is clearly "over-the-line" on the grounds that the "optimal level
of'over-the-line' unconstitutional activity is zero.""' The transaction
123. Butz v. Economou, 438 U.S. 478, 503 (1978).
124. Id. at 503-04; Neb. Beef v. Greening, 398 F.3d 1080, 1083 (8th Cir. 2005) ("Although
the lack of a Bivens remedy would not entitle the defendants to qualified immunity, the issue
is 'analytically antecedent to, and in a sense also pendent to, the qualified immunity issue."')
(quoting Drake v. Scott, 812 F.2d 395, 399 (8th Cir. 1987), affd on reh'g, 823 F.2d 239 (8th
Cir. 1987)).
125. A clearly established right exists if"[t]he contours of the right [are] ... sufficiently clear
that a reasonable official would understand that what he is doing violates that right."
Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640 (1987).
126. Pagan v. Calderon, 448 F.3d 16, 31 (1st Cir. 2006).
127. See Alan K. Chen, The Facts About Qualified Immunity, 55 EMORY L.J. 229, 262, 267-
76 (2006) (chronicling how the Supreme Court has moved from treating qualified immunity
analysis as a quasi-factual inquiry to a purely legal one, "to make it as much like absolute
immunity as possible without formally abandoning the idea that civil rights claimants can
still enforce the Constitution").
128. Gilles, supra note 44, at 849-50 ("In applying the doctrine of qualified immunity,
courts are essentially engaged in the project of drawing a line that separates (i) police conduct
which, although possibly violative of constitutional rights, is either socially useful, not terribly
egregious, or both; from (ii) police misconduct which very clearly violates constitutional rights
and which, as least implicitly, courts recognize as being devoid of social utility.").
129. Id. at 853 ("[T]he basic idea is this: we seek to identify police conduct that may be
socially useful and, even if that conduct is (non-egregiously) unconstitutional, we accord it
immunity from suit. At the same time, we identify conduct that we are not worried about
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costs in the line-drawing are supposedly minimal, as courts can
easily detect constitutional violations resembling intentional
torts.130 Any further liability, the argument goes, would increase net
social costs.'31
Though ostensibly designed to reign in the costs of civil litigation,
qualified immunity is not without costs of its own.3 2 Qualified
immunity, for instance, may freeze constitutional development.
Courts calcify the expansion of individual rights by only penalizing
conduct that was "clearly established" as unconstitutional at the
time of the supposed harm.' Efficiency evaporates when courts
cannot respond to the lessons taught by experience:
The economic model then is one of a command economy, not a
market one. In a market economy, people's responses to prices
form only one part of a cybernetic system in which the necessary
concomitant is the response of prices to people's demands. In the
current microeconomic incentive model, the pricing structure is
frozen. By shielding the investigation of possibly unconstitu-
tional behavior, qualified immunity prevents adjustment of the
pricing structure. Unlike other tort liability regimes, where
industry standards and professional norms evolve and affect
overdeterring-conduct that is lacking in social utility, or shocking and egregious--and we
label it 'over-the-line' and expose it to liability.").
130. Id. at 857 ("The avoidance of over-the-line actions does not entail substantial
compliance costs, as ... intentional torts or crimes ... can be avoided with minimal effort or
precaution-taking .... By exposing to liability only conduct that is objectively reasonable in
light of the unclear nature of the relevant constitutional law, the qualified immunity doctrine
avoids the compliance costs that inevitably come into play where ... socially valuable activity
runs up against uncertain standards of constitutional liability." (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted)).
131. Gilles, supra note 44, at 856 ('The compensated costs of constitutional violations will
generally not exceed the social benefits ... except in a relatively minor category of cases that
he likens to 'intentional torts or crimes."').
132. See generally Diana Hassel, Living a Lie: The Costs of Qualified Immunity, 64 Mo. L.
REv. 123, 148-56 (1999).
133. Jonathan M. Freiman, The Problem with Qualified Immunity: How Conflating
Microeconomics and Law Subverts the Constitution, 34 IDAHO L. REV. 61, 80-83 (1997); cf.
Giovanna Shay & Christopher Lasch, Initiating a New Constitutional Dialogue: The Increased
Importance Under AEDPA of Seeking Certiorari from Judgment of State Courts, 50 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 211, 215, 228 (2008) (describing how the development of substantive criminal
procedure is frozen by 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which prohibits federal courts from granting
habeas relief unless the underlying state court conviction evidenced "an unreasonable
application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States" (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1) (2000))).
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prices, qualified immunity freezes the prices of constitutional
torts at an abnormally low level."M
The common law tort regime, by contrast, reaches the optimal rule
through decentralized, forward-looking adjudication; under this
regime, the legal rules change in response to what experience
declares efficient.
The cost of constitutional calcification i"5 will only exacerbate in
light of Pearson v. Callahan,'36 the Court's latest qualified immunity
decision. For eight years, under the mandate of Saucier v. Katz, 137
federal courts decided qualified immunity questions using a two-
step sequence. First, the lower court would decide if a constitutional
violation occurred.'38 If it found a violation, only then would it
determine whether the constitutional right was clearly estab-
lished. '39 The Saucier two-step was designed to further the develop-
ment of constitutional common law.
140
Saucier was a response to a number of costs pervasive in the
qualified immunity rule. The "clearly established" requirement
freezes the expansion of constitutional rights and chills decen-
tralized decisionmaking.14 1 When lower courts throw out a Bivens
or § 1983 suit merely because the putative right was not "clearly
established," they fail to refine constitutional common law, because
"[a]n immunity determination, with nothing more, provides no clear
standard, constitutional or nonconstitutional.' 4' Refining constitu-
tional common law is a critical function of constitutional tort suits,
however. 4 ' Without refined standards, future litigants and lower
courts will lack guidance and litigation will increase. Recognizing
134. Freiman, supra note 133, at 73.
135. See also Jefferies, supra note 101, at 91 (discussing how Bivens may impose
calcification costs by making courts more reluctant to find constitutional violations and award
money damages).
136. 129 S. Ct. 808 (2009).
137. 533 U.S. 194 (2001).
138. Id. at 201.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. See supra notes 134-35 and accompanying text.
142. County of Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5 (1998).
143. See, e.g., Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 609 (1999) ("Deciding the constitutional
question before addressing the qualified immunity question also promotes clarity in the legal
standards for official conduct, to the benefit of both the officers and the general public.").
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this problem,' Saucier mandated the two-step sequence. 145 But
Pearson overruled Saucier's "order of the battle," and gave federal
courts carte blanche to dismiss Bivens and § 1983 suits before
reaching the constitutional question.1 46 In short, Pearson increased
the costs of constitutional calcification that accompany the qualified
immunity standard.
The development of constitutional law, of course, imposes costs
too. Lower courts expend time and resources when they demarcate
the contours of constitutional rights. This expenditure becomes a
waste--"an essentially academic exercise"147 -when a lower court
could dismiss because the right was not clearly established as a
threshold matter. 148 The benefits of development may be limited
where the decision is highly fact-specific 49 or based on an ambigu-
ous interpretation of state law. 5 ° Less intuitively, constitutional
development may lead to bad constitutional law. In the pleading
stage, courts may not adequately make legal decisions where the
factual basis has not developed.' 5 ' And during the Saucier experi-
ment, while lower courts developed more constitutional law, they
also sided more often with the government.'52 Plaintiffs got past the
qualified immunity stage less often after Saucier than they did
before."'5 To the extent that the government was already undeterred
from violating rights, Saucier made things worse.
144. Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201 ('This is the process for the law's elaboration from case to
case, and it is one reason for our insisting upon turning to the existence or nonexistence of a
constitutional right as the first inquiry. The law might be deprived of this explanation were
a court simply to skip ahead to the question whether the law clearly established that the
officer's conduct was unlawful in the circumstances of the case.").
145. Id.
146. The Court did admit, however, that the Saucier two-step doctrine was preferable in
certain situations. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 818.
147. Id.
148. Id.; Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618, 2641 (2007) (Breyer, J., concurring in the
judgment in part and dissenting in part) ("Sometimes the [Saucier] rule will require lower
courts unnecessarily to answer difficult constitutional questions, thereby wasting judicial
resources.").
149. Pearson, 129 S. Ct. at 819.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 818-20.
152. Nancy Leong, The Saucier Qualified Immunity Experiment: An Empirical Analysis,
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Lost in the debate between Saucier and Pearson, however, was
what role optimal deterrence would play in qualified immunity
jurisprudence. Optimal deterrence would appear to be an important
consideration. After all, constitutional development is less valuable
if it does not develop in the right direction. The strain on judicial
economy is a ubiquitous fear, but the fear cannot exist in a vacuum.
Worries about litigation costs are unwarranted if more litigation
reaches the efficient result. As it has in other contexts, the Pearson
Court failed to consider the deterrent effect that constitutional tort
litigation has on government employees. Pearson illustrates once
again that deterring unconstitutional conduct is a secondary value
in the Court's qualified immunity jurisprudence.
By contrast, the Court chronically worries about the potential
costs of constitutional tort litigation. The qualified immunity
defense arose in the 1970s and 1980s as a response to the perceived
excesses of § 1983 and Bivens claims.'54 Meanwhile the Court also
started cutting back on Bivens' scope. These two contemporaneous
doctrinal shifts developed without reference to each other. Both
aimed to ferret out claims that would have a chilling effect on
legitimate governmental conduct.'55 Limiting Bivens, while expand-
ing qualified immunity, then, served redundant functions. If a
plaintiff establishes a Bivens action, the court is essentially con-
vinced that overdeterrence would not occur. The plaintiff, however,
may still lose on qualified immunity grounds, precisely because
the imposition of liability would lead to overdeterrence. Through
their expansive and overlapping rationales, Bivens and qualified
immunity combined to encourage illegitimate behavior by federal
employees.
154. Evan J. Mandery, Qualified Immunity or Absolute Impunity? The Moral Hazards of
Extending Qualified Immunity to Lower Level Officials, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POLY 479, 483
(1994).
155. Compare Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 814 (1982) ("At the same time, however,
it cannot be disputed seriously that claims frequently run against the innocent as well as the
guilty-at a cost not only to the defendant officials, but to society as a whole. These social costs
include the expenses of litigation, the diversion of official energy from pressing public issues,
and the deterrence of able citizens from acceptance of public office."), with Wilkie v. Robbins,
127 S. Ct. 2588, 2604 (2007) ("Exercising any governmental authority affecting the value or
enjoyment of property interests would fall within the Bivens regime, and across this enormous
swath of potential litigation would hover the difficulty of devising a 'too much' standard that
could guide an employee's conduct and a judicial factflnder's conclusion.").
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Paradoxically, at the same time, qualified immunity has features
that could lead to overdeterrence of legitimate governmental
conduct. Although qualified immunity seeks to prevent "over-the-
line" conduct, the line itself is fuzzy. 5' In ascertaining where the
line is, government actors, naturally risk-averse, may overcomply
and forego socially beneficial activity.1 7 This bizarre outcome means
that qualified immunity not only imposes a significant cost, but a
cost contrary to qualified immunity's original purpose.
It is impossible to assess the costs and benefits of Bivens without
considering the costs and benefits of qualified immunity. Although
the two doctrines are logically distinct, they operate in tandem. By
neglecting the two in context, courts fail in their duty to "[weigh]
reasons for and against [subjecting federal employees to potential
liability], as common law judges have always done."'58 And because
qualified immunity already weeds out claims that would chill legit-
imate governmental conduct, an economic analysis of Bivens need
not be as concerned with the costs of suboptimal overdeterrence.
III. BIVENS IN ITERATED AND NON-ITERATED GAMES
The literature about Bivens ignores that a federal employee
interacts with a citizen in one of two ways. The first case is a one-
shot transaction: the employee violates a citizen's constitutional
rights at one discrete moment and never again." 9 In the second
case, a high likelihood exists that the same employee recurrently
violates the constitutional rights of the same victim. Economists call
the first situation a non-iterated game and the second an iterated
game."8 For the purposes of measuring specific deterrence, the
distinction matters quite a bit. The deterrent effect of a Bivens ac-
tion is much greater in an iterated game.
156. Mandery, supra note 154, at 500-05.
157. Id.
158. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. at 2591.
159. Cf. Park, supra note 31, at 440 ("The rights established in constitutional tort actions
are generally applied in discrete transactions between individual plaintiffs and individual
government officials.").
160. See ROBERT AXELROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION 27-69 (1984).
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A. A Game-theoretic Analysis of Federal Land-use Disputes
This Section models the optimal deterrence of federal harass-
ment as a game. The game consists of two players: the federal agent
and the landowner.161 Each player has two strategies: cooperate
or defect. A government official "cooperates" by refraining from
violating constitutional rights. In the property rights context,
cooperation means interacting with the plaintiff through lawful
means.'62 The official could, for instance, bargain with the land-
owner, buy the land, take the land through eminent domain,
lawfully regulate the land, or leave the landowner alone. A govern-
ment official "defects" by violating constitutional rights, or in this
specific case, harassing the plaintiff. Here, harassment means a
pattern of intentional and illegal conduct in an effort to extract a
property interest. The landowner "cooperates" by acquiescing to the
federal official's demands by alienating the property interest. The
landowner "defects" by refusing to do so. A landowner's defection
could result in other actions: he could negotiate with the federal
agent, alienate the property to a private party, commence a lawsuit,
seek administrative relief, or engage in private self-help measures.
The game, then, yields four different sets of payoffs based on the
combination of the plaintiffs and defendant's strategies. The game
assumes that all parties are rational'63 and that there is perfect
information.'64 For the federal agent, public choice theory dictates
his rational choice.'65 The landowner seeks to maximize his inter-
personal utility.
161. This assumption, of course, simplifies the fact that multiple federal agents could act
in concert, and does not account for the fact that the government could act in its corporate
capacity. Similarly, the target entity might be a firm or a group of landowners instead of one
individual. None of the simplifications should affect the incentives and payoffs in the game.
162. To avoid a circular definition, "unlawful" conduct does not necessarily refer to action
that would give rise to a Bivens action. Rather, it refers to a pattern of harassment-some of
which might be lawful, some of which might not-to extract the property right, in which the
federal employees are motivated by bad faith.
163. See DOUGLAS G. BAIRD ETAL., GAME THEORY AND THE LAW 11, 27-28 (1994).
164. Id. at 312.
165. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Uselessness of Public Use, 106 COLUM.
L. REV. 1412, 1440-43 (2006).
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B. Government as a One-time Transactional Actor
Does a Bivens action deter a federal official who likely violates the
victim's constitutional right only once? In Bivens, federal narcotics
agents raided Webster Bivens's home without a warrant, manacled
him in front of his wife and children, threatened to arrest his entire
family, and strip searched him at the courthouse. 16 6 Bivens was
never actually tried or convicted.167 There was no evidence that the
federal narcotics agents knew or had a reason to personally know
Bivens."6 ' The agents raided Bivens's home due to faulty informa-
tion, not due to any feature about him.169 Thus, there was little
reason to suspect that the federal agents would unconstitutionally
raid Bivens's home again and humiliate him.'70
Similarly, in Davis v. Passman,'7' Congressman Otto Passman
fired a female employee on the basis of her gender.'72 Passman
wanted his deputy administrative understudy to be a man because
he did not believe women could handle the pressures of the job.'73
Even with a damages remedy, as the Supreme Court found, it is
seriously unlikely that Passman would ever again be in the position
to discriminate against Shirley Davis on the basis of her gender.'74
Thus, if a federal official would likely violate a given individual's
constitutional right only once, there is not much room for added
specific deterrence. The potential benefit of added specific deter-
rence is low because the particular federal actor is unlikely to
166. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d 718,
719 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
167. Id.
168. See id.
169. See id. at 720-21.
170. But see David Rudovsky, The Qualified Immunity Doctrine in the Supreme Court:
Judicial Activism and the Restriction of Constitutional Rights, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 23, 60-61
(1989) (discussing situations in which law enforcement officials retaliate against citizens for
filing suit).
171. 442 U.S. 228 (1979).
172. Id.
173. Id. at 230.
174. Id. at 245. It is worth emphasizing that specific deterrence does not account for cases
in which the federal agent violates the constitutional rights of other similarly situated people.
For instance, specific deterrence does not measure whether Congressman Passman would
sexually harass other women in his office, or whether the federal narcotics agents would raid
other homes. Those cases fall under the ambit of general deterrence.
1770 [Vol. 50:1739
AN END-RUN AROUND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE?
recommit the constitutional tort against the particular victim, even
in the absence of a Bivens action.
C. Government as a Repeat Transactional Actor
In an iterated game, the landowner and federal agent interact
multiple times. This changes the incentives of cooperating or
defecting because each game creates reputational effects that would
alter the parties' behavior after each iteration.17 It makes sense
that Bivens would have a higher specific deterrent effect in iterated
games. The purpose of Bivens, after all, "is to deter the officer."'76
Bivens actions would deter the same federal agents from behaving
the same way against the same victim. In the West, for instance,
federal agencies like the BLM deal with landowners like Robbins on
a regular basis.'77 Moreover, a negotiation, which classically consists
of repeated offers and counteroffers, is an iterated game under
which the incentives change from game to game. This is unlike the
facts of Bivens, under which the victim presumably would never
again interact with the narcotics officers. 7 '
Take Robbins as an example. Because the BLM had regular
contact with Robbins,'79 a successful suit would more likely deter
the BLM for several reasons. A lawsuit signals information to the
parties.8 0 In particular, a successful verdict signals to the victim
that the government is at fault, and that a victim has a right.'18 The
outcome would signify that the BLM can successfully negotiate
only if landowners are willing to do so.'82 A successful verdict would
make a landowner less willing to do business with the official or
agency, and thereby raise the political and monetary costs of
negotiating and carrying out its land use objectives.8 3
175. See generally BAIRD, supra note 163, at 159-87.
176. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 485 (1994).
177. See Debra L. Donahue, Western Grazing: The Capture of Grass, Ground, and
Government, 35 ENVTL. L. 721, 721-806 (2005).
178. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d
718 (2d Cir. 1969), rev'd, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
179. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2593-94 (2007).
180. See Gilles, supra note 44, at 859.
181. Id.; see also Park, supra note 31.
182. See Park, supra note 31.
183. See Gilles, supra note 44, at 860.
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Second, a verdict for Robbins would certainly deter the BLM from
harassing him thereafter. The verdict would send the BLM a signal
that (1) a court looks unfavorably on its actions and (2) Robbins has
the incentive to legally defend his property right if the BLM
threatens it. The BLM can continue to harass Robbins, and perhaps
acquire an easement if he capitulates."s But the probability of
Robbins's acquiescence is low, because Robbins now knows that a
court is likely once again to impose a damages judgment against the
BLM. Aside from the reduced likelihood that Robbins surrenders,
the BLM does not gain any expected utility from harassing Robbins.
The costs of a damages judgment would include administrative
expenses, presumably passed on to the taxpayers. Another potential
cost would occur if the unconstitutional government behavior were
socially beneficial but then stopped.
Or take the case of Bush v. Lucasl"' as another example. Because
the employee was not terminated, he would have to interact
repeatedly with the government official."l 6 In the absence of a
remedial scheme that provided damages, the employer would be
suboptimally deterred from abridging the employee's freedom of
speech.
D. A Fourth Amendment Example
In the context of a Fourth Amendment search, the police-citizen
interaction exemplifies an iterated game. The officer's decision to
search depends on the citizen's decision to grant consent, and vice
versa.'87 The police officer "cooperates" by searching when the
suspect grants consent, or when the police officer believes he is
following the law. The officer "defects" by searching without consent
or probable cause. 8 This game assumes that the only remedy is the
exclusion of illegally obtained evidence at trial; the citizen is not
allowed to sue the officer in his personal capacity for money
damages.
184. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 60-62.
185. 462 U.S. 367 (1983).
186. Id. at 370.
187. Standen, supra note 50, at 1463.
188. Id.
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The suspect "cooperates" by granting consent when he believes
the police officer is legally entitled to enter. The citizen "defects" by
not granting consent. This game is iterated because decisions of
each party depend on the decision of the other. Assume now that the
only remedy for unconstitutional police behavior is the suppression
of illegally obtained evidence-that is, the citizen does not have
access to a damages remedy. The respective expected utilities
appear in Figure 1.
Figure 1: No Bivens Damages in an Illegal Search and Seizure
Iterated Game'89
Player Two-Federal Agent (FA)
Player Cooperate Defect
One-Citizen Cooperate (C, FA) (0,0) (-15, -70)
(C) Defect (C, FA) (-70, -15) (-50, -50)
In the first square, the police officer rightfully asks for consent
and the citizen provides it; neither side incurs any harm. Moving to
the top-right square, the police officer conducts a search without the
citizen's consent, even if the citizen would have provided it. The
officer's harm is relatively great because his search is likely
unconstitutional; however, because the penalty is exclusion of the
evidence instead of personal liability, the officer's harm is not
absolutely high, as he does not internalize all of the costs of his
unconstitutional conduct. 90 The citizen suffers harm, but the
dignitary harm is limited by the citizen's belief that the search was
constitutional. The bottom-left square occurs when the officer
lawfully searches but the citizen withholds consent. In this case, the
officer suffers harm to the limited extent that his search will be
declared unconstitutional. The citizen will suffer a greater harm,
however, stemming from the indignity of having the police conduct
an unwanted search on the premises. If both players defect, shown
in the bottom-right square, the harm to both parties will be
substantial; the officer faces a high risk that his search will be
declared invalid, and the citizen still suffers dignitary harms.
189. Id. at 1464 fig.1.
190. Id. at 1467 & n.116.
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This situation presents a Prisoner's Dilemma because each party
has the incentive to defect, ending up in the lower-right square,
even when the best point for both parties is the top-left square.'
The citizen's optimal strategy is to withhold consent, whereas the
officer has the incentive to enter without consent or probable cause.
Their respective strategies yield a higher ratio of unconstitutional
behavior.
Damages may provide a solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma by
giving the government official and landowner the incentive to
cooperate. In such a case, damages bridge the informational
asymmetry- each party knows the likely consequences of cooperat-
ing or defecting, and tailors his actions accordingly. Damages
provide the federal agent with information about the expected value
of engaging in harassing behavior. It gives the landowner knowl-
edge about the rationality of a damages suit, given the costs of
litigation and the amount of harassment.
IV. ANALOGIZING NUISANCE TO HARASSMENT RELATED TO
LAND USE
Nuisance common law already provides monetary remedies for
interference with private property rights. A Bivens remedy pro-
tecting property rights appears to overlap with those protections.
This double coverage prompts two questions. First, if a Bivens
action provides a redundant remedy, why should it exist?'92 Second,
if Bivens is not redundant, why use Bivens instead of extending
preexisting takings or nuisance doctrine?
To the first question, Bivens production would not duplicate
remedies under the common law nuisance. To the second question,
Bivens protection should exist alongside nuisance because, although
they share many critical similarities, they also share doctrinal
tensions.
191. Id. at 1466; see also BAIRD, supra note 163, at 312.
192. The Court contemplated this scenario in Bivens itself. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Fed.
Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 396 (1971).
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A. Advantages of the Nuisance Analogy
Conduct like that in Robbins is best conceived as a nuisance for
efficiency purposes. Doctrinally, this approach is defensible, as
constitutional torts "should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural consequences
of his action."'93 Because damages are usually the most efficient
remedy for a tortfeasor's nuisance, it follows that a Bivens action is
likely more efficient than an injunction.
Under common law, a defendant is liable for private nuisance if
he intentionally and unreasonably interferes with another's use and
enjoyment of his land.' The remedies for nuisance include
injunction, purchased injunction, or money damages.195 Nuisance
cases paradigmatically refer to socially beneficial activity with
negative externalities.'96 There is some modest authority holding
that government-imposed nuisances can become a taking.'97 And
nothing in its definition precludes nuisance from encompassing the
type of harassment that Robbins suffered. 9 '
Nuisance, unlike an "accident" tort such as negligence, is not
a discrete singular event. Instead, it is usually continuous.'9
Nuisances typically occur when transactional costs are high, usually
when the class of harmed plaintiffs cannot effectively bargain with
the defendants.2 °° With disputes involving a nuisance, giving
either the defendant or plaintiff a property entitlement is ineffi-
193. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (finding that police officers acted "under the
color" of law, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 when, without authorization, they broke into a
man's home, made him stand naked in the middle of the home, and ransacked every room in
his apartment); Park, supra note 31, at 398-99 ("Because of the general similarities between
constitutional and common law torts, it is natural to conceive of the function of constitutional
tort action in common law terms.").
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1977).
195. See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT
LAW 46-47 (1987).
196. Id. at 48.
197. Richards v. Wash. Terminal Co., 233 U.S. 546, 553 (1914); Thornburg v. Port of
Portland, 376 P.2d 100, 110 (Or. 1962).
198. Nuisance, for instance, does not require trespassory harm. See, e.g., Branning v.
United States, 654 F.2d 88, 99 (Ct. Cl. 1981).
199. LANDES & POSNER, supra note 195, at 42.
200. id. at 43.
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cient.2°l In other words, an injunction is inefficient.2 °2 By contrast,
a liability rule under which the defendant has to pay money
damages is efficient.2" 3 A property right (or injunction) is efficient
only if the damages to the plaintiff exceed the damages that the
defendant would suffer if the nuisance stopped.2 4 If the defendant's
nuisance creates significant social value, and that value exceeds the
amount of harm incurred by the plaintiff, then it is inefficient to
have the defendant pay damages.
B. Disadvantages of the Nuisance Analogy
Although nuisance law provides a fitting economic framework, it
faces two doctrinal difficulties. The first doctrinal difficulty occurs,
as Professor Carlos Ball has recently recognized, when the govern-
ment commits nuisance, because the line between a taking and
nuisance is unclear and arguably incoherent.20 5 Professor Ball
proposes that government-imposed nuisances merit money dam-
ages, subject to intermediate scrutiny.2 ' It is unwise, however, to
characterize government-imposed nuisances as per se takings for
three reasons. First, if such a nuisance were always a per se taking,
then some very socially beneficial outcomes would be offset, and
perhaps become outweighed by the monetary reward.20 7 Second,
nuisance and takings law have different ends. Like constitutional
tort doctrine, nuisance law attempts to minimize interference
with property rights while maximizing economically productive
201. Id. at 44.
202. An injunction, however, may be warranted due to the iterated nature of the activity
in question. Id. at 47 ("In principle an injunction may even be used in an accident case: it
would forbid the defendant to repeat the dangerous conduct that led to the accident and thus
would obviate the need for further damage actions. The critical difference, however, is that
an accident victim rarely has an incentive to get an injunction against the defendant. The
probability that the plaintiff will be involved in a second accident with the same injurer is
ordinarily remote. The defendant's future conduct is more likely to be a danger to other
people. In nuisance cases the future injury (all or at least part of it) is to be the plaintiff, who
therefore has an interest in getting an injunction against future harm as well as damages for
harm already suffered.").
203. Id. at 44.
204. Id.
205. Carlos A. Ball, The Curious Intersection of Nuisance and Takings Law, 86 B.U. L. REV.
819, 821-22 (2006).
206. Id. at 850-51.
207. Id. at 856.
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activity. 2°8 Takings doctrine, by contrast, attempts to spread the
landowner's loss onto the public in order to offset the public's
benefit.20 9 Third, characterizing government-imposed nuisances as
takings would be doctrinally incoherent. According to Professor Ball,
the Takings Clause is the "minimum form[] of [property] protec-
tion., 210 To treat nuisance as a per se taking would essentially put
nuisance below the constitutional floor.211
Should the victims of government-imposed nuisances receive as
little protection as the victims of regulatory takings? Professor Ball
says no, giving three reasons why government-imposed nuisances
merit a higher form of scrutiny than the deferential Penn Central
test. First, the government typically commits nuisance in its
enterprise capacity-for example, as the operator of a landfill-in
which it resembles a private business more than an impartial
mediator.212 Second, the victims of a nuisance usually want to
continue ordinary land use, whereas the victims of a regulatory
taking usually want to intensify land use.2" 3 Finally, plaintiffs in a
regulatory takings suit are more likely to engage in harmful land
use than the victims of nuisance.2 4 The upshot, then, is that
regulatory takings jurisprudence does not offer private property
owners the protections they deserve when governmental officials
engage in a repeated pattern of intentionally harmful conduct.
The second doctrinal difficulty is that landowners likely do not
have private rights of action against federal employees for nuisance.
Although the Tucker Act waives sovereign immunity with respect
to regulatory takings suits, 21 ' a landowner is barred from seeking
just compensation when an executive level employee takes property
without congressional authorization.1 6 But, as discussed earlier,
208. Id. at 857.
209. Id.
210. Id. at 858.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 862.
213. Id.
214. Id. at 863.
215. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000) (granting jurisdiction in the United States Court of
Federal Claims for any claim against the federal government to recover damages founded on
the Constitution).
216. See, e.g., Reg'l Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. 102, 126-27 (1974); United
States v. N. Am. Transp. & Trading Co., 253 U.S. 330, 333 (1920); Hooe v. United States, 218
U.S. 322, 335-36 (1910).
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cases like Robbins resemble the tort of nuisance more than any
existing cognizable constitutional cause of action, such as a per se
or regulatory taking. Under the Tucker Act, a landowner cannot sue
the federal agents in tort.217 The Federal Tort Claims Act also offers
no relief, because it does not authorize constitutional tort suits
against federal employees.218
These two limitations demonstrate the gap between statutory and
constitutional remedies. The statutory remedies do not cover the
harassment, whereas the constitutional remedies are impotent to do
so, to the extent that constitutional remedies even exist. Although
nuisance common law provides a useful framework to analyze bad-
faith federal interference with property rights, the landowner would
still lack a colorable avenue for compensation-that is, unless a
landowner has access to a Bivens remedy.
V. SLOWING THE END-RUN AROUND THE TAKINGS CLAUSE
Combining the insights of iterated games, common law nuisance,
and Takings jurisprudence, this Section has two purposes. First, it
explains why federal employees have a structural incentive to
behave the way the BLM agents did in Robbins. Second, it shows
that a Bivens remedy would change the incentives of the game, more
effectively deterring such harassment.
A. The End-Run Explained
Assume no Bivens relief, consistent with the Court's holding in
Robbins. Federal agents have three basic options to regulate the use
of a particular piece of private land. First, it could voluntarily
negotiate with the landowner and purchase or acquire the property,
a servitude, or easement. Second, it could regulate the land,219 and
perhaps be subject to a regulatory takings suit. Third, it could ex-
plicitly take the property using eminent domain, pay just compensa-
217. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2000) ('The United States Court of Federal Claims shall have
jurisdiction to render judgment upon any claim ... not sounding in tort.").
218. FDIC v. Meyer, 510 U.S. 471, 477-78 (1994).
219. See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 165, at 1426-39 (listing the ways in which the
government can effectively take property through its regulatory powers, in a way not subject
to the constraints of eminent domain).
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tion, and use the land as it wishes. Figure 2 shows the game and the






Figure 2: Extensive Form Game Two Hams Give P
without a Bivens action
(L2 aFA2) Landowner (L3 FAt)
Continue
Iterating
The game begins with a threat: the federal agent demands the
property right, "or else." Assume momentarily that the landowner
does not comply. Now, the federal agent has three options. Taking
the property (FA2) would impose large monetary costs on the federal
agent but give the landowner relatively high compensation (L).
Giving up would inflict a minor reputational cost on the federal
agent, because his future threats may lose credibility (FA3). The
landowner's payoff is the benefit of retaining the property (L3).
Suppose the federal agent harasses the landowner-say, by a
common law trespass. If the landowner complied (L,), his payoff
would be negative: he would lose the value of the property right and
suffer the cost of the trespass. If the landowner did not comply, the
220. See AXELROD, supra note 160, at 68-69.
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federal agent would have his turn, with the incentive to harass.
Thus, after each iteration, the landowner's harm increases by the
amount of the harassment. At some point, the cumulative costs of
harassment will eventually induce the landowner to forfeit. His
negative payoff will be the costs of the property and the costs of
bearing the harassment. Absent a Bivens action, the landowner's
optimal payoff is at L, In other words, the landowner should forfeit
upon a credible threat from a federal agent.
How does this outcome arise? The federal government simply
lacks the incentives to bargain with the landowner. Compare, for
instance, the payoffs associated with eminent domain with those
associated with voluntary bargaining. The government's expected
transaction costs are lower in an eminent domain proceeding. For
one, the constitutional limit on the federal government's eminent
domain power is very weak. Although the Constitution requires that
land only be taken for a "public use," the Supreme Court has held
that the government can take private property for private use if it
serves a "public purpose"221-which now includes a good faith belief
that the taking will raise more tax revenues.222 So the possibility
that a court will enjoin the land seizure is low. Bargaining, by
contrast, normally imposes high transaction costs.
Eminent domain also yields lower expected actual costs than does
negotiation. The Fifth Amendment requires that a taking be
accompanied by "just compensation." '223 Just compensation-which
the Supreme Court has read to mean "fair market value"224-also
distorts a voluntary bargain between government and landowner.
For instance, a court would not compensate the landowner for the
value of a functionally equivalent replacement of the property.225
Nor does fair market value take into account the intangible,
subjective valuations of the property, such as its sentimental
value.226 The landowner probably never gets the subjective value of
221. Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1954).
222. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 487-88 (2005).
223. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
224. United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 373-74 (1943).
225. See United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 516-17 (1979).
226. See Lucas J. Asper, The Fair Market Value Method of Property Valuation in Eminent
Domain: "Just Compensation" or Just Barely Compensating?, 58 S.C. L. REv. 489, 500-08
(2007).
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his property even if the government does constitutionally compen-
sate him.227 The upshot, then, is that the government necessarily
pays less in an eminent domain proceeding than it would in a
voluntary negotiation.228
Conversely, when faced with eminent domain, the landowner
would have lower expected payoffs compared to negotiation. Because
the takings and compensation schemes are so skewed in favor of the
government, the transaction costs for a landowner to challenge a
taking would be very high, whereas the expected return would be
very low. Additionally, the government faces problems relating to
fiscal illusion. Because the government can acquire property at less
than the value at which the owner would sell, it does not have to
bear the entire cost of the project's worth.229 The incentive, then, is
for the government to engage in projects that would not maximize
the value of the land.23" Finally, because the government has a legal
advantage in taking property very easily, it has an insuperable
bargaining chip that forces the landowner to sell at a low price.231
Now, compare the expected costs and benefits of land-use
regulation and eminent domain. The government's expected benefits
might be lower. It might not achieve the productivity and efficiency
gains from owning the land.2"2 Also, the government would face a
higher risk of a Takings Clause violation if it withheld or granted
privileges, in order to exact concessions from the landowner.2 3
At the same time, the expected costs would be lower.234 The
government would not have to pay fair market value for the land.
The landowner, not the government, would internalize any costs
227. Id. at 499.
228. Decreasing the purchase price, of course, is intended (and perhaps socially optimal)
in so-called "hold out" situations. In a hold out situation, because the landowner has a
"bilateral monopoly" over the land, and thus has the incentive to raise his asking price ad
infinitum. Without eminent domain, the government is prevented from acquiring a piece of
property it really needs. See POSNER, supra note 23, at 55. Hold out problems are not relevant
to the issues addressed in this Note.
229. See Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomvsky, Taking Compensation Private, 59 STAN.
L. REV. 871, 881-84 (2007).
230. Id. at 883.
231. See id. at 887-90.
232. See id. at 881-84.
233. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (requiring an "essential nexus"
between the exaction and the land use to survive a Fifth Amendment challenge).
234. Bell & Parchomvsky, supra note 165, at 1442.
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associated with regulation. And finally, the transaction costs of a
takings suit would be low, as the government rarely loses a
regulatory takings suit.2" 5
Federal officials can engage in discrete acts of harassment-some
illegal, some not. The landowner may not have a private right of
action to sue the government for some of the illegal offenses. For
others, such as trespass, the landowner may sue, but the transac-
tion costs-for instance, hiring a lawyer---could outweigh the
probable damages. Because ten lawsuits usually cost more than just
one, the expected costs for suing for each illegality may dwarf the
expected benefits, especially when some of the torts only yield
nominal damages.
This discussion assumes that the landowner will receive some
compensation for his troubles. After Robbins, however, it appears
that federal officials can harass a private landowner-sometimes
legally, sometimes not-in the hope that the private party capitu-
lates to the government's demands for land or an easement. This, in
essence, creates a financial incentive for federal agents to make an
end-run around the Takings and Just Compensation Clauses,236 for
"coercion is the adoption of some bargaining strategy that leads to
an unacceptable deviation from the original set of entitlements." '237
235. See supra notes 74-80 and accompanying text.
236. See Tribe, supra note 21, at 60 ("Without the threat of personal liability under Bivens,
officials working for a federal agency that seeks to acquire a private property interest but
either lacks statutory authority to obtain it by eminent domain or has insufficient funds in
its budget to purchase it for its fair market value have nothing to lose and much to gain by
using the kinds of harassing behavior that the BLM employees used against Robbins.").
237. RIcHARD A. EPSTEIN, BARGAINING WITH THE STATE 75 (1991).
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B. Righting Unconstitutional Wrongs Without Shackling Federal
Agents
Now assume Bivens relief is available to the landowner. Figure 3
illustrates the expected payoffs.
Federal
Agent
Figure 3: Extensive Form Game with a
Bivens action
Figure 3 has payoffs identical to Figure 2, with the exception of
L, and FAB, which represent the expected utilities of a Bivens suit.
The landowner's payoffs (LB) will depend on the magnitude of
harassment and the likelihood the Bivens suit will succeed. It is
important to emphasize that a Bivens suit does not fix all harass-
ment problems. In some cases, the harm from harassment may not
be great enough to justify the costs of suing. In others, due to
doctrines like qualified immunity, a Bivens suit may not succeed. A
Bivens verdict may not impose sufficiently high costs (FAB) to deter
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a federal agent. Although Bivens is no panacea, it arrests the end-
run in limited situations. If the landowner could file a Bivens suit
for the aggregate harm that has accrued through the government's
misconduct, then federal employees may not have the incentive to
commit torts-such as trespass-that would normally yield nominal
damages while causing a landowner grief. The transaction costs for
suing would be lower, because the landowner would not need to sue
for each discrete act in the chain of harassing conduct. The adminis-
trative costs, however, would be greater if more landowners sued.
As Justice Ginsburg's dissent in Robbins pointed out, however, if
similar suits against state officials under § 1983 are any indication,
such suits are not frequent." 8
The counterargument that Bivens actions may restrict the scope
of a constitutional right. 9 is well taken, but inapplicable in this
case. As it stands, the scope of protection offered by the Takings
Clause is very limited.240 For instance, the injunctive component
of the Takings Clause, which requires that the governmental
purpose be for a "public use," has been reduced to "hortatory fluff."24'
The damages element of the Takings Clause, which requires that
the government pay "just compensation," systematically undercom-
pensates property owners. Regulatory takings jurisprudence is
also very limited.242 After all, "[i]n adjudicating constitutional tort
actions, courts must often adapt rights to different contexts.
Narrower rights are appropriate in some settings while more
expansive rights are appropriate in others.""24
Professor Levinson warns against assuming that damages deter
the government in the same way that they do for private entities.244
238. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2615-16 (2007) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
239. See Jefferies, supra note 101, at 89-90.
240. Cf. Park, supra note 31, at 450 ("In some cases, the prospect of significant damage
liability can influence courts to narrow rights. But without an individual remedy many such
rights would not have been established in the first place.").
241. Kelo v. New London, 545 U.S. 469, 497 (2005) (O'Connor, J., dissenting); see also
Richard A. Epstein, Kelo: An American Classic (Of Grubby Particulars and Grand Principles),
8 GREEN BAG 2d 355, 361 (2005); Timothy Sandefeur, Mine & Thine Distinct: What Kelo Says
About Our Path, 10 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 43 (2006).
242. See supra text accompanying notes 74-80.
243. Park, supra note 31, at 437.
244. Levinson, supra note 40, at 346.
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Despite the government's behavior to the contrary,245 let us assume
that Professor Levinson is correct. His theory does not mean,
however, that Bivens will have no deterrent effect. At most, the
effect may be smaller. Assuming, however, that federal agents are
undeterred from unconstitutional behavior, Bivens still has a role
to play if it provides some incentives to behave closer to the socially
optimal activity level.246 Even if Bivens has no quantifiable deter-
rent effect, it still has qualitative force.
CONCLUSION
Cases like Robbins not only evidence an end-run around the
Takings Clause, but also "a death by a thousand cuts, ''247 under
which a landowner has no legal recourse for cumulative acts of
nuisance. The two problems have significant economic repercus-
sions. A game-theoretic model shows that federal employees have
little incentive to respect property rights when statutory, common
law, and constitutional remedies are unavailable. Although the
Supreme Court purported to "weigh[] reasons for and against the
creation of a new cause of action, ' 248 it did not rigorously consider
the balance of incentives in play when federal agents harass a
citizen in order to acquire his property rights.249 In determining
245. See Rosenthal, supra note 40, at 841 ('The existence of immunity legislation is itself
the strongest evidence for the conclusion that elected officials are highly sensitive to
governmental damages liability. If, as predicted by Levinson, elected officials were indifferent
to liability, they would not bother to enact immunity legislation.").
246. See Gilles, supra note 44, at 879-80 ("Professor Levinson's argument stresses that
optimal deterrence on the standard law and economics model is not achieved by the
imposition of constitutional tort remedies. I agree. We lack the necessary information to 'price'
constitutionally infringing conduct by government officials in order to achieve optimal
deterrence against future violations. But ... constitutional tort remedies nonetheless service
a vital-if not 'optimal'-deterrent function.").
247. Tribe, supra note 21, at 23.
248. Wilkie v. Robbins, 127 S. Ct. 2588, 2600 (2007).
249. One commentary described the Court's reasoning in Robbins as such:
The Court, ... adhering to the superficial trend of rejecting Bivens claims,
disrupted the measured development of the Bivens doctrine. In contrast to the
detailed analyses of the previous Bivens cases, the Court's analytical
approach-which it optimistically described as "weighing reasons for and
against the creation of a new cause of action, the way common law judges have
always done"-lacked sophistication. In fact, the Court conducted this analysis
without attempting to explicate, and indeed failing entirely even to mention, its
conception of the purposes of Bivens. Lacking any doctrinal theory against which
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whether to find a Bivens action, courts should "take into account [a
range of policy considerations] at least as broad as the range of
those a legislature would consider with respect to an express
statutory authorization of a traditional remedy.""25
One such consideration-the lodestar of much of policy analy-
sis-is economic efficiency. In cases involving land-use regulations,
government employees frequently interact with the same citizen.
Bivens relief, for instance, would have a stronger deterrent effect
when federal officials are likely to be repeat offenders against the
victim. Economic analysis suggests when federal officials try to
exact a property right through nuisance-like behavior, a damages
remedy may move toward the efficient result. If optimal deterrence
is a valuable goal in these cases, as it should be, then courts and
legislatures should seriously rethink the availability of damages
relief. If not, property rights may suffer yet another death by a
thousand cuts.
Arpan A. Sura
it might consider the facts it encountered, the Court proffered an inapposite,
overly simplified, one-to-one comparison between the inadequacy of the redress
Robbins had received and the "difficulty in defining a workable cause of action."
By focusing on Robbins's interest in being recompensed rather than the
necessity of a remedy for protecting constitutional rights, the Court
simultaneously blunted the true force of the action and delegitimized any
recognition of a damages remedy, thereby permitting it to find that mere
"difficulty in defining a workable cause of action" could outweigh a constitutional
interest. The Court therefore never even addressed the true merits of the claim.
Comment, Bivens Damages-Takings Clause Retaliation, 121 HARv. L. REv. 185, 192-93
(2007) (internal citations omitted).
250. Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Narcotics Agents, 403 U.S. 388, 407 (Harlan, J.,
concurring).
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